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ABSTRACT 
We develop a model for the dynamic management of spatially heterogeneous resources 
with multiple users.  We apply our model to the case of groundwater and show that – 
contrary to the results of existing studies – even when externalities are highly 
concentrated in space, significant efficiency gains are possible over competitive 
outcomes. 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
  Throughout the world, groundwater resources are a major source of agricultural, 
potable and industrial water.  Because groundwater is frequently viewed as private 
property, its extraction is essentially unregulated in many regions of the world.  As a 
result of rapidly falling groundwater levels in many of these regions, the public 
perception is that rapid overextraction and resource depletion is occurring.  This 
perception is used to justify regulatory intervention in the form of basin adjudication, 
pumping fees and quotas. 
To the economist, the stylized elements of this story – a natural resource with 
multiple, myopic users and resultant overextraction – easily conform to a “tragedy of the 
commons.”  Indeed, for the last fifty years, economists have viewed groundwater as the 
archetypal common property resource (for example, among many others, [6, 15, 21, 25]).  
The intertemporal allocation of groundwater was one of the earliest applications of 
optimal control and dynamic programming techniques to economics [6, 8].  Numerous 
studies have analyzed the externalities that multiple resource users impose on each other 
by pumping water from an aquifer.  A large body of work offers clear policy 
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prescriptions – pumping taxes or quotas – that align competitive and socially optimal 
groundwater extraction rates. 
Some major economic studies find that the quantitative difference between 
competitive and socially optimal groundwater management outcomes is negligible [15, 
17].  Thus, even though groundwater is modeled as a common property resource, there 
appears to be no economic rationale for groundwater management.  This clearly conflicts 
with management experience, which suggests impending crisis in many groundwater 
basins. 
We suggest that most economic studies of groundwater have ignored the basic 
principles of hydrology.  In particular, groundwater systems do not adjust instantaneously 
to changes in pumping rates, but diffuse gradually in response to developing pressure 
gradients.  The response of an aquifer to pumping is complex, even under simple 
geological conditions.  Aquifer behavior exhibits extreme heterogeneity: actions taken by 
one resource user have disparate effects across space and time on other users.  Thus, 
externalities are idiosyncratic and reflect not only each user’s sequence of extraction 
decisions and the physical properties of the aquifer, but also the explicit spatial 
relationship between users.  Existing theoretical models of groundwater extraction in the 
economics literature fail to capture the spatial heterogeneity of actual groundwater 
resources.  As a result, they overstate the degree of commonality between users of 
groundwater.  In this paper, we argue that misspecification of the physics of groundwater 
flow has serious consequences and necessarily leads existing studies to inappropriate 
policy prescriptions.  We develop a model of resource extraction with dynamic, 
idiosyncratic externalities that contains hydrologically correct aquifer response equations.  
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We show that under some circumstances, there is indeed little difference in the welfare 
obtained with competitive versus optimal groundwater management policies.  However, 
there also exist realistic circumstances under which a lack of groundwater management 
will entail significant welfare losses.  The magnitude of such losses will depend on the 
physical parameters of the system as well as the exact spatial relationships between 
resource users. 
Furthermore, we argue that groundwater is not, in general, a common property 
resource.  Nevertheless, we demonstrate that significant welfare gains can be achieved 
through groundwater management.  The explanation of this apparent paradox is that in 
reality, the externalities caused by groundwater pumping are extremely concentrated in 
space.  In other words, despite limited commonality among the global set of resource 
users, significant bilateral externalities exist between users located close to each other. 
We present a model for the optimal management of groundwater over space and 
time with multiple resource users.  Our model includes several major extensions to the 
existing literature.  First, the model is spatially explicit and allows the externalities 
imposed by resource users to depend on their distance from each other.  Second, the 
model allows lagged effects, permitting analysis of diffusional systems where the effects 
of actions taken at one point in the resource take finite time to reach other points in the 
resource.  Third, the model incorporates hydraulic response equations, governing the 
behavior of groundwater over space and time, from the engineering literature. 
  In Section 2 of this paper, we review the existing literature on the economics of 
groundwater extraction.  The following section presents the general dynamic 
optimization model used and derives optimal and competitive resource use paths.  In 
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Section 4, we describe the integration into the economic model of equations that correctly 
describe the physical groundwater system.  The results of welfare analyses are presented 
in Section 5.  The last section concludes and discusses the conditions under which a role 
for groundwater management exists. 
 
2.  THE ECONOMICS OF GROUNDWATER EXTRACTION 
  The earliest economic studies of groundwater pumping date from the late 1950s 
and early 1960s [21, 26].  These authors understood that extraction of groundwater from 
a single reservoir might involve an externality.  Where there were many users of a 
groundwater resource, each would fail to consider the present and future effects of their 
own actions on all other users, leading to overpumping and welfare losses.  In translating 
this qualitative description of a dynamic common property problem into an analytical 
framework, later studies made a key assumption about the physical behavior of the 
underlying resource.  The effects of each user’s extraction were assumed to be 
transmitted identically to all users.  Aquifer representations that use this assumption are 
commonly known as ‘single-cell’ or ‘bathtub’ models and form the analytical basis of 
groundwater economics. 
Early studies used dynamic programming and optimal control theory to derive 
qualitative decision rules for the optimal intertemporal management of single-cell 
aquifers [6, 8].  More recent, and influential, studies have sought to quantify the welfare 
differences between competitive and optimally managed groundwater extraction paths 
using parameters from real aquifers [1, 15, 17].  These studies have suggested that the 
welfare differences between optimal control and competitive outcomes are negligible, 
 5     
obviating the need for any centralized intervention in groundwater systems.  Critiques of 
this body of work have considered how the discount rate, possible changes in demand 
over time and technological adoption might affect the gains from optimal control over no 
management [4, 7].  However, even significant structural modifications to the 
groundwater extraction problem generally produce only modest welfare gains to optimal 
management in single-cell aquifer models.  Furthermore, recent applications of dynamic 
game theory to the problem of groundwater extraction suggest that strategic users 
exploiting a single-cell aquifer can more closely approach an optimal solution by playing 
a non-cooperative game [11, 22, 25]. 
  By definition, the spatial location of users is irrelevant in single-cell models, as 
the current state of the resource is entirely captured by a single scalar variable, usually 
either the depth to water or the stock of water remaining.  Although this leads to 
analytical tractability, it is clearly incorrect to assume that two wells one hundred feet 
apart will have the same effect on each other as wells that are ten miles apart.  A number 
of economic studies have attempted to capture this spatial heterogeneity of groundwater 
resources. 
  In so-called “two-cell” aquifer models, several adjacent groundwater basins are 
mutually connected by porous boundaries, so that water is allowed to flow between them 
[13, 16, 20, 34].  Each individual basin behaves as a single-cell aquifer, and may have 
hydrological properties and groundwater stocks that differ from its neighbors.  However, 
in two cell models, all users within each subcell still have uniform effects on each other 
and are not resolved spatially. 
 6     
  Conjunctive use models, where users simultaneously exploit surface and 
subsurface reservoirs, are analogous to two-cell models [9, 10, 18, 30, 31, 32].  The 
porous boundary between ‘cells’ of a conjunctive use model is the canal system linking a 
surface water reservoir and an aquifer.  Surface water reservoirs, by definition, are single-
cell systems; in conjunctive use models, the aquifer is also modeled as a single cell.  
Thus, as with standard two-cell models, all water users, irrespective of location, have the 
same marginal effect on the underlying aquifer. 
  Finally, aquifers may be modeled as multi-cell systems where the flow between 
cells is dictated by finite difference approximations based on the partial differential 
equations governing the flow of groundwater [2, 3, 23, 24].  Typically, such analyses are 
case studies of specific groundwater basins and are carefully calibrated using hundreds of 
parameters.  Because of this, many of these studies do not involve any economic 
optimization, but instead compare simple rule-of thumb management policies [2, 3].  The 
few studies that do involve dynamic optimization have used regression on simulation 
outputs in order to linearize relevant parameters [23, 24].  Because of their complexity, 
multi-cell aquifer models may provide management guidelines for specific groundwater 
basins, but do not provide general welfare conclusions. 
  The model we present in this paper is spatially explicit and hydrology-based.  
Rather than uniformity throughout the resource – as in a single-cell model – groundwater 
levels are allowed to vary continuously across space in response to local conditions.  In 
our dynamic model, each user’s resource use has an idiosyncratic effect on other users.  
Externalities vary across space and time as a function of the explicit spatial relationship 
between users as well as their extraction decisions.  We fully integrate hydraulic response 
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equations from the groundwater hydrology literature [12, 14, 29, 33] into this analytical 
model in order to capture the spatially heterogeneous behavior of aquifers.  This approach 
allows us to analyze how both the spatial relationship of users to each other and 
underlying resource heterogeneity affect the welfare gains from groundwater 
management. 
Our analytical approach is similar to several recent models in the fishery 
economics literature [27, 28].  In these spatially explicit models, the fishery resource is 
composed of heterogeneous “patches” of fish population with varying biomass and 
dispersal properties.  However, these bioeconomic models use steady-state analyses and 
do not obtain closed-form solutions for relevant optimality conditions [27, 28].  
Conversely, in our analysis, we are able to develop closed-form solutions to the dynamic 
optimization problem.  
 
3.  THE BASIC MODEL 
  Consider a groundwater resource with J separate users that are spatially 
distributed above the resource with fixed, known locations.  Assume that each user 
 operates a single well and must decide how much water to extract from the 
aquifer during each decision period.  Users derive per-period benefits from the use of 
water given by the function 
1, , j = K J
( ) jj t f u
() 0 t <
, where u  is the amount pumped by user j in period 
t.  Assume that there are decreasing marginal returns to pumping groundwater, so that 
 and that  . 
jt
() 0 jj t fu ′ > jj fu ′′
  Because water must be lifted from the top of the aquifer to the ground surface, 
pumping is costly.  The pumping lift for user j at time t is given by  jt x .  Defining the 
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average and marginal cost for pumping a unit of groundwater through a unit of vertical 
distance as C , the total per-period benefit net of extraction costs for each user j is given 
by 
  ( ) jt j jt jt jt f uC u x π =−  (0.1) 
The aggregate net benefit is given by the sum of individual benefits, appropriately 
discounted over the time horizon of interest. 
Pumping water from a well will result in the water surface in that well decreasing, 
or being drawn down.  Thus, as a result of ongoing resource extraction by groundwater 
users, the pumping lifts through which each unit of water must be raised will change.  
The evolution over time of water levels in the aquifer, and hence the net benefit of 
resource use, is determined by users’ extraction decisions.  These will depend on the 
assumptions that each user makes about both the physical behavior of the resource and 
the role of other users in its exploitation.  Below, we consider three different solution 
concepts, corresponding to different user behavior, for the multi-user groundwater 
extraction problem: optimal, competitive and myopic, and competitive with limited 
foresight. 
3.1.  Optimal extraction 
  The optimal extraction decisions by all users maximize aggregate net benefit and 
form a baseline from which to compare alternative user behaviors.  If the per-period 
discount factor is β  and the planning horizon spans   periods, then the vector of 
welfare-maximizing groundwater extraction paths, u , is defined by 
N
*
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M  (0.2) 
  Recharge of the aquifer, assumed to be constant and defined for user j as  j R  in 
each period, will tend to reduce pumping lifts.  Conversely, ongoing pumping will 
increase the distance through which each unit of water must be lifted: current extraction 
will adversely affect all users in future periods.  In every period the distance to water in 
each well,  jt x , will be a function of the previous extraction history of all users.  If  ijs θ  is 
the drawdown (decrease in water level) imposed on well i by user j pumping a unit of 
water s time periods ago, then the equation of motion for the depth to water for each user 
is given by 













 ∑∑ x +   (0.3) 
where  0 x  is the initial water depth.  Note that the sign of  () 1 ijs ij s θ θ + −  has not been 
defined.  If  () 1 0 ijs ij s θ θ + −= , all effects of any single period’s resource use occur 
immediately and do not change over time.  Alternatively, if  () 1 ij s 0 ijs θ θ + − > , there are 
cumulative effects from past actions and impacts on the resource accrue and increase 
over time.  Finally, if  () 1 ij s 0 ijs θ θ −< + , the system exhibits reduced impacts on the 
resource and recovery from previous actions over time.  Almost all existing resource 
economics studies make the implicit assumption that  () 1 0 ijs ij s θ θ + − = .  This means that the 
full effect on the resource of any user’s resource extraction decisions is immediate.  
However, there is no underlying physical necessity for this restriction.  In particular, for 
resources which are diffusional in character, and therefore exhibit slow adjustment to 
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extraction, the sign of  () 1 ijs ij s θ θ + −
0 ijs
 may be positive or negative.  As discussed in more 
detail in Section 4 below, groundwater systems exhibit diffusional properties.  For 
example, if pumping starts at a new well, the drawdown resulting from this change will 
not be observed at a distant point for some time.  In the model described here, this 
corresponds to  () 1 ij s θ θ −>
() 1 ij s
+ .  Conversely, after pumping from a well ceases, 
groundwater flow from surrounding areas will reduce drawdown over time.  This 
corresponds to a value of  0 ijs θ θ −<
0 ijs
+
() 1 ij s
. 
θ θ + − =













Whereas many dynamic optimization models use difference or differential 
equations to describe the evolution of the state variable, equation (0.3) is a simple 
summation.  If and only if  , equation (0.3) can be expressed as a first order 
difference equation.  If this is not the case, past actions will produce time-variant effects 
on the state variable, which will exhibit path-dependency. 
  Using equations (0.2) and (0.3), the appropriate Lagrangian for the benefit-
maximizing dynamic optimization problem is 





j t i s j j t ij t s
s j




     + − +  
     
∑ ∑  (0.4)  x   −  
where  jt λ  is the adjoint variable for user j and time period t.  The relevant first order 
conditions for this problem are 





0, 1, , 1
0
JN
i s il s k
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lk lk Cu βλ − −=  (0.6) 
 11     
The terminal value of the adjoint variable,  0 jN λ = .  Condition (0.6) may be used to 
define the adjoint variable for kN <  as  .  Substituting for both the adjoint 
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   






Concavity of  ( ) jj t f u  is both necessary and sufficient for a unique interior solution.  
Thus, as shown by (0.7), for each user it is optimal to pump water in each period until the 
marginal benefit of pumping is equal to the sum of the marginal cost and the discounted 
marginal damage imposed on all users in all future periods. 
3.2.  Competitive, myopic extraction 
  Competitive groundwater extraction by multiple users is an alternative to the 
optimal solution discussed above.  In this paper we shall not consider non-cooperative 
extraction as a strategic game.  Instead we assume that competitive groundwater users 
behave myopically.  Game-theoretic studies of groundwater extraction from single-cell 
and two-cell aquifers suggest that strategic behavior can ameliorate some of the welfare 
losses of non-cooperative extraction [11, 13, 22, 25].  However, we provide three reasons 
why strategic behavior is not of concern in the model presented in this study.  First, as 
shown by Karp [19] and Brooks et al. [5], for large numbers of resource users, myopic 
and strategic behaviors converge.  Our simulations assume that there are dozens of users; 
this is enough to ensure that strategic and myopic behavior will in any case be very 
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similar.  Second, limited survey evidence from the Central Valley of California suggests 
that actual groundwater users do not view the extraction problem strategically or take into 
account their neighbors’ behavior in deciding their own resource use [11].  Finally, in the 
single-cell model, users are symmetric and the aggregate groundwater stock is a clear 
signal of behavior.  In more complicated models with idiosyncratic, lagged externalities, 
it is not possible to uniquely ascertain other users’ behavior.  Moreover, the state of the 
resource at any point in time varies across space and depends, in a complex manner, on 
the entire extraction history before that time.  Because of this, we suggest that there is no 
aggregate measure that can be used as a meaningful signal by non-cooperative, strategic 
users.  If continuous monitoring and reporting of all users is not feasible, it is difficult to 
see how users would construct appropriate reaction functions.  Hence, in this section we 
limit ourselves to myopic behavior by groundwater users. 
  Assuming that the net benefit function (0.1) and groundwater equation of motion 
(0.3) are unchanged, the vector of myopic extraction paths   is defined as 
m u


















M  (0.8) 
Each user j will maximize their own single-period benefits without regard for the future.  
From equation (0.1), we can see that the appropriate first order condition will be 
  ( ) 0
m
jj t j t fu C x ′ − =  (0.9) 
Equation (0.9) states that myopic groundwater users will equate their marginal benefit 
with the marginal cost of groundwater extraction in each period.  Substituting from 
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equation (0.3) for  jt x , the system of equations defining the competitive, myopic solution 
is given by 







ll k i s l il k s
si




  ′ −−  
  ∑∑ + = 
3.3.  Competitive extraction with limited foresight 
  A third solution concept that we consider is competitive extraction with limited 
personal foresight.  By this we mean that individual users take into account the effects of 
their own pumping on their future groundwater levels, but consider neither the effects on 
other users nor how other users’ present extraction decisions will affect them in the 
future.  Although this kind of limited foresight is near-rational, it provides a useful 
comparison to optimal and myopic extraction as it allows decomposition of the welfare 
effects of the pumping externality into own-effects and other users’ effects.  Limited 
foresight-type behavior has been analyzed in single-cell aquifer models [22], where it is 
sometimes described as “competitive”, but not myopic.  In the case of a single-cell 
aquifer, externalities are equally imposed on all users and users are assumed to be 
identical, so that the solution exhibits symmetry not observed in this model.  Because of 
this symmetry, there is no reason to expect that resource users will ever behave with 
limited foresight in a single-cell model: if users can calculate the impact of their own 
extraction on groundwater levels, they have by definition also calculated the effect of 
every other user on groundwater levels.  This is not the case in a spatially explicit model, 
and given the complexity of calculating other users’ impacts on the resource, it is much 
more likely that users will not consider them, even if they do take into account their own 
impacts. 
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  The vector of personal foresight extraction paths, u  is defined as 
p





















M  (0.11) 
Once again, substituting for  jt x  from equation (0.3) gives the system of equations 
describing the personal foresight solution: 
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  ′ −− + − = =  
 






From a comparison of equations (0.7), (0.10) and (0.12) it is clear that the personal 
foresight pumping trajectory will fall between the myopic and optimal trajectories at 
every point in space and time.  This follows directly from the observation that the 
marginal benefit for each user under personal foresight will be between the marginal 
benefits for myopic and optimal solutions. 
 
4.  AQUIFER RESPONSE TO GROUNDWATER PUMPING 
  The drawdown function,  ijs θ , describes how the groundwater resource responds to 
pumping over space and time.  Thus, it provides the link between the physical aquifer 
system and the economic system of resource users.  For example, the single-cell aquifer 
model used in existing groundwater economics studies corresponds to the restriction that 
drawdown functions for all users and time intervals are equal, so that  ijs θ θ =  for all 
values of i, j, and s.  This leads to analytical simplicity at the expense of hydrologic 
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realism.  In order to capture the correct physical nature of the groundwater resource, the 
drawdown function must be based on the appropriate physics of fluid flow.  The 
derivation of the unit drawdown of an aquifer caused by ongoing pumping is a well-
known result in hydrology based on solution of the partial differential equations 
describing diffusional processes, and can be found in many hydrology texts [12, 14, 33]. 
  Consider an ideal aquifer, namely one that is horizontal and of infinite areal 
extent, homogeneous and isotropic, of constant thickness, and confined above and below 
by impermeable layers.  The classic result of Theis [29] is that the drawdown a distance r 
from a well pumping at constant rate u at a time s after the start of pumping is given by 









xr xr d z W





s   (0.13) 
The exponential integral with the particular lower bound of integration in (0.13) is known 
as the well function, W .  The constants S and T in equation (0.13) describe the key 
physical properties of the aquifer, namely the storativity and transmissivity of the aquifer, 
respectively.  Storativity is a measure of the impact on groundwater levels in the aquifer 
of extracting one unit of water.  It is a dimensionless parameter, defined for a confined 
aquifer as the volume of water released from storage per unit of surface area per unit 
decrease in the hydraulic head [12, 14].  The transmissivity of an aquifer is a measure of 
the speed and extent to which the impacts of any changes to the aquifer pass through it.  
Aquifer transmissivity is defined as the hydraulic conductivity of the aquifer multiplied 
by its thickness, where the hydraulic conductivity is a constant of proportionality relating 
specific discharge from a region to the hydraulic gradient across it [12, 14].  Taken 
together, the transmissivity and storativity may be thought of as describing the diffusional 
()  
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characteristics of a particular groundwater resource.  In a high transmissivity, low 
storativity aquifer, the effects of pumping at any well will quickly be observed 
throughout the resource, and each unit of water withdrawn will cause significant 
drawdown.  Conversely, in a low transmissivity, high storativity aquifer, extracting a unit 
of water will cause much less drawdown, and even this will be limited in extent to areas 
close to the pumping well. 
  The incremental drawdown between two time periods during which the pumping 
rate remains constant is thus given by the difference 
  () () ()
22
1 44 1 4
ss
ur Sr
xr x r W W
TT s T s π
−
S       −= −      −     
 (0.14) 
Note that because  () 0 Ws ∂ <   ∂  and  ( ) 0 ≥   W ,  ( ) ( ) 1 0 ss xr x r − − >
ijs
 if u > 0.  The Theis 
solution assumes a single pumping well and constant pumping rates.  However, it can 
easily be extended to include both multiple wells and pumping rates that vary through 
time.  The well-known principle of superposition in hydrology states that the drawdown 
caused by multiple wells is linearly separable [12, 14].  Thus, equation (1.14) holds for 
each well in an aquifer irrespective of the total number of pumping wells and their 
relationship to each other.  Hence the drawdown caused by multiple wells is simply the 
sum of drawdowns caused by individual wells.  Similarly, changes in pumping rate at a 
single well site can be modeled by assuming that there exist multiple wells at the same 
point in space, that each start pumping at different points in time.  Hence, a comparison 








r i jS r i jS
WW
TT s T s
θ
π
      =−       −      
 (0.15) 
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where   is the distance between users i and j.  Substitution of expression (0.15) into 
equations (0.7), (0.10) and (0.12) allows the realistic hydrologic system to be embedded 
directly into the dynamic economic framework. 
( , rij )
)
 
5.  COMPARISON OF GROUNDWATER MANAGEMENT POLICIES 
  Having developed a theoretical model of optimal groundwater management over 
space and time, it is necessary to consider the quantitative gains to possible management 
policies.  In particular, there is much debate over the magnitude of welfare gains to 
groundwater management based on calibrations of single-cell aquifer models.  As a 
baseline, using parameters for the Pecos aquifer of New Mexico, Gisser and Sanchez [17] 
found a negligible welfare difference (0.004%) between optimal control and no control 
scenarios.  Clearly, these and similar results [1, 15] suggest that regulation of 
groundwater extraction is inappropriate.  To ease comparison between existing literature 
and our study, we have used the same parameters as the studies of Gisser and Sanchez 
[17] and Gisser [15].  We have added several parameters as necessitated by our explicit 
spatial modeling (Table 1).  In particular, we use a value for storativity of 8.6 x 10
-5 and a 
transmissivity of 57,600 gallons/day/foot.  Note that these parameters do not have clear 
analogs in single-cell aquifer models.  However, the values used are in the range found in 
groundwater basins suitable for extraction [12]. 
The first order conditions derived in (0.7), (0.10) and (0.12) are systems of 
simultaneous equations.  Following Gisser and Sanchez [17], we assume that the 
individual benefit  ( jj t f u  is adequately approximated by a quadratic function.  In this 
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 is linear and conditions (0.7), (0.10) and 
















%  (0.16) 
The square matrix   holds coefficients for the set of optimal extraction paths.  It has (NJ 
x NJ) elements, and contains the slope of each user’s marginal benefit function, 
A
( ) jj t f u ′′ , 
as well as the idiosyncratic drawdown functions,  ijs θ .  The elements of the vector b are 
the sums of relevant constant terms, in this case the initial depth to water, intercepts of 
the marginal benefit function, and the aggregated sum of recharge. 
  From a comparison of equations (0.7) and (0.10), it is clear that the matrix  , 
containing coefficients for the set of myopic extraction paths, is simply the lower 
triangular portion of the matrix  .  Similarly, equation (0.12) shows that the matrix  , 
containing coefficients for the set of limited foresight extraction paths, may be obtained 




A % θ , for 
each time period. 
  Pumping trajectories for each solution concept will depend on the exact spatial 
relationship between groundwater users.  Thus, in order to analyze the welfare 
differences between optimal, myopic and limited foresight solutions, the number of 
resource users and their specific locations relative to each other must be specified.  The 
welfare differences derived for any specific set of well locations are of little interest by 
themselves, as any other set of well locations will result in different welfare measures.  
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Instead, we analyzed the mean welfare characteristics from a large number of repeated 
trials, each with a different set of randomly assigned well locations. 
  In this paper, we report results using twenty five users and seventy time periods.  
Similar results were obtained with different numbers of users, time periods, and 
hydrological parameters.  Each trial proceeded as follows.  Users were randomly located 
on the surface above the aquifer.  The mean user spacing was calculated and used as a 
measure of the spatial distribution of users for each trial run.  Each user was assigned a 
marginal benefit function whose slope was a random variable following 
   (0.17)  [ , 0.7,1.3 jj ff U εε ′′ ′′ =⋅   ]
The constant  f ′′  was chosen so that the expected marginal benefit function aggregated 
across all users had the same slope as the marginal benefit function used by Gisser and 
Sanchez [17].  Disaggregation of the marginal benefit function from that used by Gisser 
and Sanchez [17] was necessary because their original study assumed a single 
representative user.  Whereas this may be justifiable for a single-cell aquifer, individual 
users must be separately and uniquely identified in a spatially explicit model.  We chose 
to allow marginal benefit functions to vary slightly between users in our analyses to 
reflect heterogeneity between users in the real world.  However, this variability in the 
slope of the marginal benefit function does not influence our basic results.  The variance 
of the slope of the marginal benefit function in (1.17) is 0.03; resource users are still 
relatively homogeneous in their benefit characteristics.  Moreover, the same intercept on 
the marginal product axis was used for all marginal benefit functions, and again, this was 
taken from Gisser and Sanchez [17]. 
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Once user locations and marginal benefit functions were assigned, the relevant 
drawdown functions  ijs θ  were calculated and the optimal, myopic and limited foresight 
coefficient matrices ( ,   and  , respectively) constructed.  Using (0.16), the 
pumping trajectories u ,  and u  were then calculated, and the welfare under each 
trajectory was found.  Finally, the welfare differences between the optimal solution and 
the other two solutions were calculated.  Repeated trials were performed for new spatial 
locations of groundwater users and a range of aquifer surface areas (parameter values 







  By definition, the optimal extraction trajectory u  will be welfare-maximizing, 
the myopic trajectory   will have the lowest aggregate welfare, and the personal 
foresight trajectory   will attain an intermediate level of welfare (Figure 1).  This is 
because, as noted previously, with personal foresight, pumping levels in each period will 
be intermediate between the other two concepts.  Our analysis shows that there can be 
significant differences between the aggregate welfare with optimal, myopic, and personal 
foresight trajectories (Figure 1).  Additionally, the differences observed vary as a function 




  As can be seen from Figure 1, mean welfare differences are highest for small 
mean user spacing and decrease as user spacing increases.  When the distance between 
groundwater users is generally small, each user has a significant ability to impact their 
neighbors.  Because of this the own-effect is only a small fraction of the total externality 
at low mean user spacing.  The relative contribution of the own-effect on the externality 
can be seen in Figure 1, where the own-effect is represented by the difference between 
the filled diamonds and open circles at any particular mean well spacing.  At low mean 
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user spacing, most of the welfare difference between optimal and competitive policies is 
due to the aggregated externality effect of all users, of which the own-effect is only a 
small fraction.  Conversely, at high mean user spacing, the own-effect dominates the 
externality, and much of the myopic welfare loss is caused by the failure to take into 
account one’s own actions.  However, even at high mean user spacing, there can still be a 
significant welfare difference between optimal, myopic, and personal foresight 
trajectories. 
  For any given interval of mean well spacing, there is a high variance of welfare 
differences within any given user behavior (Figure 1).  For example, in the spacing 
interval 200-300 feet, the difference between optimal and myopic trajectories is between 
9% and 21%.  In the spacing interval from 30,000-40,000 feet, the difference ranges from 
1% to 6%.  This variability reflects the position of the resource users relative to each 
other.  In particular, the degree of clustering will play a major role in determining welfare 
differences, but is not resolved well with a single measure of mean spacing. 
Recall that in the original study of Gisser and Sanchez [17], the welfare difference 
between optimal and myopic trajectories was found to be 0.004%.  Most extensions of 
Gisser and Sanchez’s study modify economic variables and functions whilst maintaining 
the single-cell physical model [4, 7].  However, unless drastic changes, such as 
exponential demand growth with time, are introduced, the welfare differences between 
optimal and myopic paths in these extensions are still at most a few percent.  Conversely, 
in this study, we use the same parameter values as Gisser and Sanchez wherever possible.  
Nevertheless, our results show that a large divergence in welfare between optimal and 
competitive, myopic extraction trajectories is possible.  In particular, note that following 
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Gisser and Sanchez [17] we use a high annual discount rate, 10%, in our analysis and 
assume static demand. 
Our results demonstrate that there exist conditions under which significant gains 
from optimal groundwater management are possible.  The difference in results between 
this study and previous work is driven by the physical behavior of the underlying 
resource.  In particular, we resolve an implicit paradox that arose in previous studies.  In 
common property resources with a large number of competitive resource extractors 
imposing externalities on each other, we would expect to see significant gains from 
optimal management.  Single-cell aquifers are common property resources with multiple 
competitive users, yet previous work (counterintuitively) suggests that gains from 
optimal management are negligible.  If groundwater is modeled as a spatially explicit 
system, it is no longer strictly a common property resource.  Instead, resource users will 
have the largest effect on themselves, and their ability to impose externalities will be 
spatially limited and concentrated in a neighborhood around them.  However, when two 
wells are situated close to each other, their bilateral externalities can be extremely large, 
so that there will be a significant gain from regulation.  If all wells are far enough apart, 
the ability of any user to impact their neighbors is limited.  The groundwater that each 
user extracts is then effectively private property, and there will be no significant gains 
from regulation. 
 
6.  CONCLUSIONS 
  The optimal management of groundwater resources over space and time, and with 
multiple resource users, is studied.  We argue that a good economic model of resource 
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use is underpinned by good science, and show that in a correctly specified groundwater 
system, spatial considerations matter.  The relative locations of resource users, as well as 
their spacing, are key determinants of the externalities produced by each user’s 
extraction.  In turn, the spatial distribution of pumping externalities determines the 
potential gain from an optimal system of groundwater management, however this is 
implemented. 
For parameter values that occur in the real world, the welfare gains of optimal 
extraction of groundwater over no regulation can be significant – greater than twenty 
percent in some of our analyses.  Large gains from groundwater regulation are possible 
when water users are clustered together in space.  As the mean distance between pumping 
wells increases, the potential gains from optimal regulation decrease.  Our analysis leads 
to a seemingly paradoxical result: we show that groundwater should not be modeled as a 
common property resource, but at the same time, there may be significant gains to 
regulation because of externalities.  This is because the externalities caused by 
groundwater pumping are highly concentrated in space, and decrease rapidly with 
distance away from a pumping well. 
The results of this paper are significantly different to those in most existing 
economic studies of groundwater extraction.  In general, these studies model groundwater 
as a common property resource (the single-cell aquifer), where the externality from each 
user’s pumping is uniformly distributed to all users and all points across the areal extent 
of the aquifer. Hence, for a large aquifer, the marginal effect of a unit of pumping will be 
negligible, and the optimal and myopic competitive solutions will necessarily be very 
similar.  As shown in this paper, such single-cell models fail to capture adequately 
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important aspects of the behavior of real aquifers.  Because of this, policy 
recommendations based on such models, even when they provide both apparently robust 
and intuitively appealing results, should be viewed with caution. 
We have demonstrated that location is important in groundwater management.  
Thus, not only how much water is pumped, but where this pumping occurs, must be 
considered when evaluating water resources.  Because of this, the role of land ownership 
in determining the location of wells is critical, and will have efficiency as well as equity 
implications.  In the framework presented here, we have not considered the optimal 
location and density of wells, but this is an area for future research.  Similarly, a more 
realistic model of groundwater extraction and use allows improved analysis of 
groundwater management policies, both extant and hypothetical.  In particular, our 
analysis highlights the importance of well spacing in determining the potential gains from 
groundwater regulation.  Well spacing regulations are quite common regulatory tools in 
real-world groundwater management.  Whereas previous studies were unable to analyze 
such spatial regulations, the framework described here can provide an economic rationale 
for these zoning restrictions, and allow a comparison between spatial policy instruments 
and more traditional instruments such as pumping taxes and quotas. 
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VARIABLE VALUE 
Decision period length, days  30 
Annual discount rate, % (*)  10 
Initial water depth,  0 x , feet (*)  170 
Unit pumping cost, $/AF/foot (*)  0.035 
Per-period recharge,  j R , feet (*)  0.11 
Expected slope of aggregate marginal 
benefit function, $/AF (*) 
-3.733 x 10
-3 
Intercept of aggregate marginal benefit 
function, $ (*) 
144 
Number of users  25 
Number of periods  70 
Lengthscale of aquifer, feet  500 – 50 000 
Aquifer storativity  8.6 x 10
-5 
Aquifer transmissivity, gal/day/ft  57 600 
 
 
TABLE 1.  Parameter values used in the groundwater extraction simulation. 
Variables denoted with a (*) are taken directly from the studies of Gisser and Sanchez 
[17] and Gisser [15]. 
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FIGURE 1.  Welfare differences between optimal, competitive and myopic pumping 
trajectories. 
Results are shown for multiple trial runs using 25 users and 70 time periods.  A 
transmissivity parameter of 57,600 gal/day/ft was used, together with a storativity of 8.6 
x 10
-5.  The percentage difference in welfare between optimal, myopic and personal 
foresight pumping trajectories for each simulation run is shown.  Filled diamonds 
correspond to the welfare difference between optimal and myopic trajectories.  Open 
circles correspond to the welfare difference between optimal and personal foresight 
trajectories. 
 